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Truth Will Out: Indonesian Accounts of the 1965 Mass Violence

Tension between religious institutions and social practice

A study of the Catholic hierarchy and laity in Yogyakarta

When, in the second half of 1965, the mass violence towards members of the Communist Party began, many religious leaders experienced a moral dilemma. On the one hand, they were aware that those who were victims were people said to be opposed to religious conviction and principles. On the other hand, these victims (and their families) were ordinary people, who like us need to be treated as ordinary people. They cannot be made targets of arbitrary mass violence, as happened at the time.

At very least, this was a dilemma which, according to the following research report, surfaced in the Catholic Church in Indonesia as an example of one religious institution, specifically in Yogyakarta and its environs. This research finds that the Catholic Church (at least in the archdiocese of Semarang, Central Java) already had a stand of anti-violence. Even so, there have not been many studies examining how that policy was implemented at a social level, both while the tragedy was going on as well as over subsequent years. As the two researchers say, ‘This study sets out to explore the stages of social process, from the experience, attitudes and actions of Catholics, both Church officials and lay people, when they went through this tragedy.

The research and writing was undertaken by two members of the History Commision at PUSdEP, namely Y. Tri Subagya MA and Dr. G. Budi Subanar SJ. Apart from his membership on the History Commission, Y. Tri Subagya is also on the staff at PUSdEP and a doctoral student at Radbod University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. G. Budi Subanar is the Head of the Masters Program in Religion and Culture at Sanata Dharma University, and is also on the staff of PUSdEP.

As we know, discourse about the 1965 tragedy is debated, and in Indonesian society it always brings controversy. Attempts to open up paths for dialogue or to resolve various problems concerning the tragedy often clash with the suspicions and prejudice of groups who believe in the official version put out by the New Order authorities.71 Even so, this does not mean that this discourse is locked from within, and cannot be reviewed to obtain deeper and more complete clarification. New evidence, both in the form of documents as well as the experience of the victims, provide an important take-off point for expressions of truth and for the re-writing of history about the tragedy.72

The history of relations between religious organizations in the midst of this chaotic time needs to be re-examined without exception, because the stigma and hatred bequeathed by the past towards victims accused of being members of the Communist Party or sympathizers continues to shackle wider society. On the one hand, religious institutions were in opposition with the Communist Party and its mass organizations which were associated with atheism.

Threats and violent acts by followers of religious institutions were often not prevented, and many of them surely actively participated in the slaughter at the time. However, on the other hand, religious institutions also became places of shelter for those tortured and searching for political asylum as a result of the state policy that demanded all citizens to chose one of the five official religions. One indicator of this is the increase in conversions at the time.73

Further, the 1965 tragedy also became the turning point for relations between religious institutions in Indonesia. Today there are still religious institutions and organizations that are mutually suspicious and distant with one another in the way they run their congregations as well as the way they position themselves in national life. The Protestants, for instance are suspicious of the Muslims who want syariah law as the foundation of the state, and have created marginalization and implemented discriminative practices. On the other hand, the radical Islamic group always sees ‘Christianization’ as an ongoing threat, including the accusation that many of the ex 1965 political prisoners and those claiming to be followers of traditional beliefs allegedly converted to Protestantism and Catholicism.74

Qualitative approach

Studies focusing on the role and place of religious groups and institutions in the 1965 crisis are relatively limited. One such study is that carried out by young Nahdlatul Ulama members associated with the organization ‘Syarikat Indonesia’ which is based in Yogyakarta. They have been intensively involved with, and attempting reconcilation with victims, even though many of their own parents or the older generation were perpetrators or even murderers in the mass slaughter. Even so, to date they have had no official or serious institutional support from their religious organization for their activities. Because there has never been any organizational official statment from any religious organization in relation to the 1965 tragedy apart from Nahdlatul Ulama, there is the general perception that religious organizations other than NU have no interest in pursuing reconciliation from their own involvement in the 1965 violence.75 In Catholic circles, similar efforts have failed to attract attention. Where there is attention, it is usually limited to discourse or to charitable activities in connection with assistance and relief to victims.

Taking these problems and studies mentioned above as a starting point, in writing the findings of our research we want to highlight the role of the (institution) of the Church and Catholics in the 1965 tragedy. There has already been a general study about the policies of the Church in the archdiocese of Semarang in coping with the tragedy, but there has not been an explanation of the actual practices in society. This study examines and scrutinizes the position and activities of the Church and Catholics in the midst of that turbulent time.

In particular, it sets out to describe various incidents that affected them when faced with traumatic and painful situations in the history of Indonesian social life. To get a more complete picture, this study examines the stages in this social process from the experiences, attitudes and actions of Catholics, both Church officials and lay people. We examine the role of the Church in Indonesia in the 1965 crisis, through the role of the Church hierarchy in decision making at the height of the tension and killing of those accused of being members of the Communist Party. This study is an attempt to investigate the position of the Catholic Church both collectively and individually. We hope the findings will serve as a basis for reconciliation or resolution of the bitter experience of this national tragedy.

The parameters are limited to the Semarang archdiocese of the Catholic Church, and specifically, the area of Yogyakarta. However, this does not mean that this study touches only upon sources in this area. It also covers different areas where these can sharpen the analysis or serve as points of comparison. The researchers employed a qualitative approach. Data was gathered using oral history methods with in-depth interviews. Some key informants were asked to retell their past experiences and to reflect upon these within the situation and context of that time.

The data the researchers gathered was cross-checked with other doc­uments and archives accessible to us. The informants for the research were obtained using a snowball technique, with the criteria that they themselves had both experienced and had sufficient understanding of the problems faced by the Catholic church at that time; for instance whether they were representatives of the institution of the Church or were individuals when making decisions. Priority was given to informants from Yogyakarta and Central Java. This was because of the focus of the study, and also because of our limitations of energy and funding. We also carried out library research. Before writing the final report, we also carried out a series of limited discussions with other members of the History Commission of PUSdEP. In these discussions, we often criticized each other and exchanged ideas about problems that were the focus of our various studies, including this one.

Hostility between the Catholic Church and the Indonesian Communist Party

One study that examines the position and attitude of the Catholic Church towards the 1965 tragedy was carried out by examining the archives of the Semarang Archdiocese from 1940 to 1981.76 Even though this study stressed the history of the independence of the Catholic Church there, some attention is also given to the position of the Church and the stance its officials took towards the 1965 tragedy. In general, the study points out that the Church prioritized humanitarian problems in the midst of this tragedy of bloodshed. In other words, even though the Catholic Church opposed communism and the Communist Party, when the violence was going on the Church called for protection for and gave assistance to victims without paying heed to their affiliation with the Communist Party.

It is commonly understood that all over the world the Catholic Church opposes communism. Indonesia is no exception. Long before the 1965 tragedy occurred, Catholic Church officials in Indonesia stated that institutionally the Church was diametrically opposed to the Communist Party, even though there were Catholics who became members of the party, or sympathizers.77

This stance of opposition was evident when the clash of ideology between social groups began heating up. In December 1955, the Commission of Indonesian Bishops (Komisi Wali Gereja Indonesia) issued a manifesto called the Catholic Manifesto (Manifesto Katolik) making this position clear. In February and April 1957, when President Sukarno invited prominent figures from the Indonesian Catholic Party (Partai Katolik Indonesia) to respond to his ‘konsepsi’ or idea to form the National Council (Dewan Nasional) and ‘Four-Legged Cabinet’ (Kabinet Kaki Empat) which would include the Communist Party, they rejected this idea outright. It was noted, for instance:

[I.J. Kasimo stated that if one looked at history, when communists were included in the cabinets of Eastern European countries, they gradually made those countries turn communist. Therefore, he did not agree with including communist elements in the cabinet. And therefore, he could not agree with the President’s ‘Konsepsi’.78

In line with the Church’s rejection of communism, the Archbishop of Semarang, Msgr A Soegijapranata played a very important role in fostering this opposition within the Catholic lay community. Opposition towards communism and the influence of Communist Party mass organizations was fostered through discussions, for instance through contact with Catholic politicians and with lay organizations at the grass roots level.79

It seems that politicians in the Catholic Party were also working hard to stop the Communist Party gaining access to strategic positions in power. Anticipating the possibility that the Communist Party would strengthen its position with cabinet posts in government, Frans Seda, who initially refused to sit in the Cabinet of 100 Ministers, subsequently accepted the position of Minister of Agriculture (Menteri Perkebunan) with the support of the army. About this, it has been said:

While negotiating (with Catholic Party figures), General A. Yani telephoned and urged the party and Frans Seda to agree to sit in Cabinet, in order to strengthen the anti communist front in government. According to gossip in the palace, the seat planned for Frans Seda was Minister of Fisheries ([derisively called] Minister Lele fish). However Pak Yani said No … he would fight, and he was lobbying Sukarno via Pak Leimena, for [Frans Seda] to get the Minister of Agriculture post, because this was a sector with capital, and had to be protected from Communist Party/ leftist influence.80

It appears that the Catholic Party figures’ attitude was welcomed by military officers who also wanted to demonstrate their enmity towards the Communist Party. A number of informants said that leading up to the 1965 tragedy, Muslim, Protestant and Catholic religious figures unified in their opposition to the Communist Party, and disseminated messages to their faithful of high alert towards the ideology and the party itself.

It is interesting to note that while relations between the Church and the Communist Party were in opposition, the Catholic Church consistently rejected the use of violence when the military mobilized the people to wipe out Communist Party members and sympathizers. One can find this stance in three letters issued by Church officials in the Semarang Archdiocese over those years. Among the letters is one that urges the government to avoid violence in its handling of things. As Subanar summarizes:

The first letter was written by Father Carri SJ, Assistant to the Bishop of the Semarang Archdiocese, and consists of a call to all the faithful to demonstrate their Catholic spirit of pro ecclesia et patria in Indonesia based on Pancasila which respects pluralism in society and acknowledges belief in God. The second letter was directed to the clergy and members of religious orders in the Semarang archdiocese and forbids them from taking part in military actions to sift out or hunt down members of the Communist Party. The third letter was addressed to the Catholic laity, and calls upon them to support the actions to sift out Communist Party members which are led by the army, but not to involve themselves in any acts of violence.81

The stance the Church took in giving priority to humanitarian principles cannot, it seems, be separated from the confused situation of the time, along with the Church’s moral teachings that are indeed based on humanitarian concerns. The confusion of the situation was particularly connected to the varied positions and backgrounds of Catholics in the national political arena. Many Catholics, particularly those who were newly baptised, were anxious about suspicion and accusation that they were atheist communist party escapees. Some among the converts came from groups following traditional beliefs, and had formerly practised local religions. Even though among Communist Party members there were some Catholics, the number was not significant. Some parishes kept record of the increase in their congregataions between 1965 and 1970. The wave of conversions was particularly driven by government policy with the ruling in 1966 that required all citizens to choose one of the five official religions recognised by the government, namely Islam, Protestant Chistianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

Attitudes towards the Catholic Church’s efforts

In this tense situation, the Church rejected the proposal to make identity cards for Catholics, reasoning that this would sharpen the conflict, and also avoiding the accusation that new converts were purely escapee Communist Party members. Further, the Indonesian Bishops Conference issued an encyclical to parish priests to make a record of victims in their parishes. Apart from efforts to prevent violence, Church officials actively participated in assisting and giving relief to political prisoners who were members and sympathizers of the Communist party, and to their families.

In the Semarang Archdiocese in 1969 the Cardinal’s Social Program (Program Sosial Kardinal or PSK) was begun especially for this purpose, and in Yogyakarta, the Realino Foundation (Yayasan Realino) likewise. In 1981, these programs and humanitarian activities spread to various areas in Indonesia, including Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Purwokerto, Malang, Surabaya, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makasar, Ambon, Medan, Pangkal Pinang, Padang, Palembang, and Tanjung Karang. Meanwhile, under the coordination of Father de Blot SJ, brothers, nuns and congregations gave not only pastoral care, but also material and health assistance in some prisons and detention camps, including Buru island. This assistance was not restricted to detainees, but also extended to their families. One of these prisoners has said:

Father de Blot did a lot for the political prisoners. He visited the detention camps, brought things to entertain us, and then negotiated food assistance like bulgur cracked wheat and corn sugar milk. This assistance came from the alliance of Catholic and Protestant churches. It is important to note, but without resentment, that there was never any assistance from Islamic bodies. Probably they thought that the communists were atheists, so let them just die. This was part and parcel of the authorities’ propaganda and incitement. Then there was the issue that the Christians were giving aid so they could convert the political prisoners. We can swear that this was not true. The churches gave assistance based on humanitarian principles.82

And another:

Thanks to the Dutch priest, Father de Bleg [de Blot, ed.] as we called him, my younger siblings and I were able to get out of prison. I had been in prison only a few months when Father came and collected me.83

Pastoral care was a program that the government supported, through the army’s Centre for Spiritual Development (Pusat Pembinaan Rohani ABRI) working together with the Department of Religion. This was intended for the mental rehabilitation program called ‘Santiaji’ for the improvement of political detainees accused of being atheist. But according to many political detainees, this program was more like indoctrination and instruction to perform one’s religious obligations according to the religion they had been previously registered with, and they could not suddenly attend services of a different religion.84

The clergy who former political prisoners remember as having performed pastoral care and humanitarian activities on Buru island include Msgr Andreas Sol MSC, Father Roovink, Father Mangunwijaya, Sister Cecilia dan Sister Fransisca. In Flores, a priest at Bola parish, Yosef Frederikus da Lopez, tried to free 45 people detained at the army headquarters because they were suspected of being members of the Communist Party. Father Lopez managed to meet the commander and gave a personal guarantee for their freedom, but he succeeded in getting only 10 freed.85 The humanitarian activities of various Catholic social organizations on behalf of former political prisoners later spread to the parish level, or the lowest strata in the Church hierarchy.86

This pastoral care and humanitarian work by Catholic clergy and laity did not proceed without difficulty. Some Catholic priests were under pressure from the military because of their activities in helping political prisoners. In Purwodadi (Central Java) for instance, some members of the parish management were arrested, tortured and detained after a parish youth and the parish priest gave testimony to H.J. C Princen, a staunch defender of human rights, about a mass killing that had happened in the area. They were arrested after the interview was published in the mass media, making the government and local officials feel cornered. The arrests seem to have been an attempt to stifle people so they would not talk about despicable things they saw. At the time this happened, the government extended an invitation to print journalists to travel around that area, as its way of deflecting attention and removing traces of the sort of disgusting things H.J.C. Princen related. People say that this tour by the group of journalists, sponsored by the authorities, was more like a picnic, because the people they met and the places they visited had been spruced up for them, and were nothing like the story they had got beforehand.87

Catholic attitudes towards the 1965 tragedy

The tension between political parties also affected the lives of ordinary citizens, including Catholics. The tension escalated in 1965.88 Even though when the 30 September 1965 event actually happened, this was not seen as an extremely dangerous moment.89

The Catholic Church’s anti-communist stand had a significant influence on its faithful, both individually and collectively. One group of Catholics extremely active in exposing and opposing communism and its movements was the Documentation Bureau (Biro Dokumentasi) led by Father Beek S.J. The Documentation Bureau was conceived by and had the blessing of Church officials, but its position was not directly within the church hierarchy. The bureau collected various socio-political documents, analyzed them, and then distributed them in the form of a newsletter. The material aimed to provide information, at least to Catholic politicians, about the heated and unclear socio-political situation.

Among the analysis and problems highlighted by the Documentation Bureau at the time was the hostility between the religious, nationalist and com­munist groups. The Bureau supplied analytical material to support activists from the Pancasila Front and Sekber Golkar [Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya] who were taking a firm stand of opposition to the National Front supported by the Communist Party.90 Even though the Documentation Bureau only distributed articles, the analysis of which was up to the readers, still it seems to have contributed to shaping the opinion and providing input to several important figures in their stance towards the Communist Party. In his autobiography, Cosmas Batubara mentions the importance of the Documentation Bureau in obstructing communism, which helped Catholic university students get prepared in the midst of the political tension. According to Cosmas,

The contribution of Father Beek SJ was enormous in developing a system of documentation about communist activities and the activities of non communist groups opposing them. From his documentation system we knew exactly what themes the communist group was employing to shore up its strength. As university student cadres were getting more prepared, we also prepared ourselves for undesired situations. Leading up to the G30S/PKI incident there were more frequent meetings between Catholic and Muslim groups.91

The Catholic students and activists’ opposition movement towards the Communist Party took the form of moral pressure to dissolve the party and to participate in drawing up the ‘Delaration by Pancasila Supporters, the Charter of Unanimity’ (Deklarasi Pendukung Pancasila, Piagam Kebulatan Tekad) on 31 December, 1965. This declaration was made together with various social groups, religious mass organizations and political parties opposed to the Communist Party. The embryo of the movement came from a group of Muslim and Catholic high school and university students who, with the support of the military regional commander Jaya Umar Wirahadikusuma, established the Union to Annihilate the 30th September Movement [Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan (KAP) Kontra Revolusi Gestapu]. They demanded that the Communist Party be dissolved and the closure of all media that supported the 30th September Movement. They attacked Communist Party offices and buildings. On 25 October 1965, at a meeting of KAP, the leaders agreed to form KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Action Union), which was made up of Muslim, Protestant and Catholic students in mass demonstrations. In January 1966, KAP became the ‘Pancasila Guard’ (Garda Pancasila) whose activities were more focused at the top level of politics. Meanwhile, in many areas the annihilation of the Communist Party and its followers was being carried out by religious mass organizations with military support.

It is not known how far Catholic youth were involved in the violence and annihilation of people accused of being communists, because organizationally both the PMKRI and Catholic Youth called for restraint in the racism and provocation of the government and army’s operations to restore order. However, some sources have mentioned that there were Catholics who took part in the killings, particularly those in the Pancasila Guard who received military training.

At the grass roots level

At that critical time, there were some Catholics who were not members of the Communist Party who were also thrown into prison because they protected families or people being hunted, or who were wrong­fully arrested. Some documents note that the Communist party did not limit its membership exclusively, because it was an open party whose members could come from any religious group. Even so, opponents of Communist Party politics always tried to link the party with the issue of atheism and anti-religion. Paul Webb and Steven Farram (2005) have studied Catholics and Protestants in Flores, Sumba and Timur who did not escape violence and being hunted down because they were members of the Communist party. And Hasan Raid (2001) and Ahmadi Moestahal (2002) have told of their experiences as Muslims, and that of their friends in prison, who became Communist Party members because of their support for the people’s interests. The image of the Communist party as being diametrically opposed to religious groups, and even being anti-religion, tended to be politicized by religious groups and the military in order to destroy the party and wipe out its followers.

As suggested above, even though on the one hand the Catholic Church opposed communism, on the other, the Church faciliated humanitarian efforts for victims and their families with instructions to prominent lay persons and priests. They not only prevented or averted violence, but also protected and assisted those in prison and their families left behind. Allegedly, the role and approach of Catholic church figures in humanitarian deeds attracted the sympathy of victims and the marginalized. Some researchers see the implications of this in the rise of converts after the 1965 tragedy.92 However, there are indications that the increase in the number of Catholics was not only from those who were victims of the 1965 tragedy, but also from those who previously were adherents of local religions.93 After the government regulation of 1966, they were forced to chose one of the five official religions.

Stories in various areas show much diversity behind people’s choice in becoming Catholic at that time. The hard work and dedication of priests and religious teachers in answering their needs was one human meeting point. Another was finding new hope for improvement in their family’s finances. Here is one testimony:

Eight years after I was baptized, my prayers were answered at last. Yes, in 1967 Mr Yohanes Suhardi – or Pak Hardi as I called him - from Gawan, was baptized Catholic. One day, Pak Hardi told me that he was interested in becoming Catholic. Apart from the fact that he had been a high school student at SMP Saverius Gawan, which was in its golden age at the time, he was also attracted by Father Wakkers SJ. His fluency speaking Javanese, even high level Javanese, reflected an extraordinary Christian view of life. No cultural divisions, no ‘Dutch’ness could obstruct him in spreading the love of Christ. And what was interesting, Pak Hardi also talked about Father Wakkers’ ballpoint which was an unusual one for those days. Jokingly, Pak Hardi did not object when some said that his faith grew from the point of Father Wakkers’ pen.94

Or this:

Ruslan Kocoatmojo not only taught religion. He encouraged those beginning to know Christ to make fish pools, cooperatives and chicken farms, and to open policlinics. Because this practical work brought concrete results, people who were passive at first gradually took catechism classes. When there were more than ten of them, the village head got worried. He did not want to take responsibility for what would happen if the numbers swelled further. Luckily, the Commander of the Military Sector allowed us to continue. The people of Ngaliyan then appreciated the religion classes held on Tuesdays and Saturdays even more.95

Some studies and documents above show that the 1965 tragedy dragged Catholics, both as victims and as perpetrators, into the current of violence which was supported by the military and the state. Even though the Church’s position, in its hierarchy, prioritised the humanitarian giving of protection and assistance to victims, this did not mean that there were not Catholics participating in the violence.


From the above analysis, is is clear that the Church’s position at the time was diametrically opposed to communist ideology and the Communist Party in the national political arena. Even so, when the mass killings and hunting of party members and sympathizers was going on, the Church, through its officials, endeavoured to prevent the death of victims, and at least to prevent the participation of Catholics in violence. Later, the Church established social foundations to protect and assist the victims. There were also, undeniably, Catholics who were Communist Party sympathizers and who became victims, but this was not the reason the Church took the stand it did, rather its actions were based on humanitarian principles. The Church’s position allegedly made many former political prisoners choose to convert to Catholicism, both as part of their effort to find political asylum, and for spiritual reasons.

71 The New Order version of the 1965 tragedy can be found in various history textbooks as well as the film produced by the New Order titled Pengkhianatan G30S (The G30S Treachery). Books include the so-called ‘white book’ or official document published by the Sekretriat Negara Republik Indonesia titled Gerakan 30 September: Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi dan Penumpasannya. 1994 (The 30th September Movement: The Indonesian Communist Party Rebellion: Background, Actions and their Annihilation). 1994.

72 After the fall of the authoritarian New Order in 1998, various memoirs and accounts by victims of the tragedy appeared along with some studies that showed new documents and perspectives on the incidents of violence and cruelty. Some of these include Tahanan Politik Pulau Buru 1969–1979 (I.G. Krisnadi, 2001); Menembus Tirai Asap, Kesaksian Tahanan Politik 1965 (Sasongko dan Budianta, 2003); Aku Eks Tapol (Setiawan, 2003); Dalih Pembunuhan Massal (Roosa, 2008).

73 Subanar, 2005; Nugroho, 2008.

74 See Mujiburrahman, 2006; Hasan, 2007.

75 The scholar Benedict R. O’G Anderson declared that NU is more honest than other religious institutions like the Protestant, Catholic and Muhammadiyah groups, which he sees were involved in the slaughter but covered it up. He made this statement in an interview on Radio Nederland. The transcript of the interveiw can be downloaded on Most likely this opinion springs from the statement of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid as a respected NU ulama who called for reconcilation with the former 1965 political prisoners and the end to discriminative practices towards them. His call was answered by activities carried out by some youth organizations who endeavoured to open the path to reconciliation in various places. However, Abdurrahman Wahid’s stand and that of the young NU groups also met with opposition from some ulama and members of Nahdlatul Ulama who did not agree with them.

76 See G. Subanar (2005)

77 Webb and Farram, 2005; Mujiburrahman, 2006.

78 [I.J.] Kasimo mengemukakan bahwa menurut pengalaman sejarah, pengikutsertaan orang-orang komunis di dalam kabinet di negara-negara Eropa Timur, lama kelamaan menyebabkan negara-negara itu menjadi komunis. Oleh karena itu ia tidak setuju kalau di dalam kabinet dimasukkan unsur komunis. Dan oleh karena itu pula ia tidak dapat menyetujui Konsepsi Presiden. Panitia Penulisan Kompas-Gramedia, 1980:83–84.

79 Subanar, 2005:149.

80 Sementara berunding (dengan tokoh-tokoh partai Katolik), Jenderal A. Yani menelpon, dan menganjurkan agar Partai dan Frans Seda menerima untuk duduk dalam Kabinet, supaya memperkuat front antikomunis di dalam pemerintahan. Menurut desas-desus di Istana, jabatan menteri yang direncanakan untuk Frans Seda adalah Menteri Perikanan (”Menteri Lele”). Tetapi Pak Yani berkata,” Tidak … akan diperjuangkan dan sedang di lobby-kan pada Sukarno lewat Pak Leimena, untuk jabatan Menteri Perkebunan, karena sektor itulah sektor modal, dan harus diamankan dari pengaruh PKI/kiri. Panitia Penulisan Kompas-Gramedia,1980:85

81 Subanar 2995:149. When the violence was going on, the Archbishop in Semarang was attending the Second Vatican Council in Rome. Because of this, the letter was issued by the official representing him. When he returned from the Vatican, Msgr Darmojuwono reaffirmed the Church’s stand by asking the military authorities to give security and protection to people, based on a commitment of mercy.

82 Mia Bustam 2008:123

83 Abdullah Saleh et. Al. 2003:77.

84 Sumarwan, 2007:159–199; Nugroho: 2008:113–114.

85 Mujiburrahman, 2006:25.

86 Subanar, 2005:153.

87 About the efforts to cover up the tragedy, and the journalists’ tour to Purwodadi, see Maskun Iskandar and Yoppie Lasut, “The Purwodadi Killings: Two accounts”, in Robert Cribb (1990), 195–226. We thank Father Baskara T. Wardaya SJ who allowed us to listen to an interview with a trusted source about this matter.

88 Djoko Pranoto: 2010.

89 Soe Hok Gie, in his diary also depicted the tense situation of these times. Members of Catholic Youth had to keep constant guard over their organization’s secretariat, and were also involved in protecting churches. On 1 October 1965, one member of Catholic Youth from Yogyakarta went to Jakarta and had to go in hiding from place to place. See the account in this book ‘The Grand Scenario’

90 An example of the Documentation Bureau’s analysis of the communist movement and the murder of the Generals can be found in Soedarmanto (2008:163–170)

91 Quoted in Soedarmanto, 2008:161.

92 Spyer, 1995: 171 ; Nugroho, 2008

93 Budi Subanar (2005: 150)

94 Lilik Andoko, 2007:247.

95 Budi Sarjono, Daniel Tatag, 1997: 26

Truth Will Out: Indonesian Accounts of the 1965 Mass Violence

   by Dr. Baskara T. Wardaya SJ